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Preface
The analysis in this report has been conducted by the Fraser of Allander Institute (FAI) at the University of 
Strathclyde. The FAI is a leading academic research centre focussed on the Scottish economy. 
The report was commissioned by GMB Scotland. GMB Scotland asked the FAI to provide a summary of the 
current state of play in respect of possible post-Brexit trade outcomes for the UK and Scotland. They also 
asked us to provide an illustration of the key linkages between current Scottish economic activity and 
different export markets, with a particular focus on different sectors.  
The technical analysis, methodology and writing of the results was undertaken independently by the FAI. 
The FAI is committed to informing and encouraging public debate through the provision of the highest 
quality analytical advice and analysis. We are therefore happy to respond to requests for factual advice and 
analysis. Any technical errors or omissions are those of the FAI.
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Executive summary 
x Brexit has the potential to have a major impact on the future structure of both the 
Scottish and UK economies.    
 
x Most independent analysis has concluded that Brexit will weaken the UK’s (and 
Scotland’s) growth prospects in the long-run. But the implications could look quite 
different for particular sectors and companies and much will depend upon how 
policymakers respond.  
 
x In 2015, Scotland exported £12.3 billion of goods and services to the EU – equivalent to 
over 40 per cent of Scottish international exports – more than exports to North America, 
Asia, South America and the Middle East combined. But the data shows that many other 
parts of the UK appear relatively more open to EU trade. 
 
x Six of Scotland’s top 10 destinations for exports are in the EU. A further two – Norway 
and Switzerland – are part of trade arrangements with the EU which may need to be 
negotiated post-Brexit.  
 
x There are around 1,000 enterprises in Scotland where the parent company is from 
another EU country and they employ around 130,000 people. At the same time, there 
were around 180,000 EU nationals living in Scotland in 2015 – indeed it is estimated 
that half of the net increase in the Scottish population between 2000 and 2015 has 
come from people born in EU countries.  
 
x Goods make up the bulk of Scottish trade with the EU. In 2015, just over 60 per cent of 
Scottish trade with the EU was from manufacturing. 
 
x The most significant sectors are those associated with refined petroleum and chemicals 
activities, and food and drink (of which whisky and linked products like are key).  
 
x It is possible to look at the jobs supported by the demand currently generated from 
exports to various markets. This includes not just the direct employment, but the onward 
spill-overs into the supply chain and onward consumer spending.  
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x It is estimated that around 134,000 jobs are currently supported by export demand from 
the EU, and slightly under 196,000 from the rest of the world. It is estimated that over 
560,000 jobs in Scotland are supported by demand from the rest of the UK.  
 
x In other words, nearly 6 per cent of total employment in Scotland (excluding public 
sector administration and defence) was supported by demand currently driven by 
exports to the EU.  
 
x Of the 134,000 jobs estimated to be supported by demand from the EU, around 55,000 
were in manufacturing and 73,000 in services. The higher number in services reflects 
the impact of spill-over effects from trade into the wider Scottish economy.  
 
x In manufacturing, this includes around 13,000 job in food and drink, and 11,000 jobs in 
metal work and machinery. In services, nearly 30,000 jobs in finance and business 
services are estimated to be currently supported either directly or via wider spill-over 
impacts by demand from the EU. The equivalent figure for distribution, hotels and 
catering is 22,000.  
 
x Just over 27 per cent of jobs in the refined petroleum, chemical and pharmaceutical 
sector in Scotland are estimated to be supported by demand generated directly from EU 
exports. For food and drink, the equivalent figure is 12 per cent, whilst for computing 
and electrical products it is 21 per cent.  
 
x In terms of the relative importance of sectors, there are some important differences 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK. For example, the drinks sector is Scotland’s 
second most important sector in terms of goods trade to the EU, but it ranks nineteenth 
for the UK as a whole. Similarly, fish exports are third for Scotland but do not even 
feature in the top twenty for the UK. At the same time, top sectors for the UK – like 
transport manufacturing – do not feature in Scotland’s top of goods exports.  
 
x Ultimately, the full impact on Scottish industries and individual companies will depend 
upon a number of factors – not just exposure to EU markets – but also the type of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers that may exist post-Brexit. The importance of EU migrants as a 
source of skilled labour may also be significant for some individual firms and sectors.  Of 
course, much will depend upon the future policy responses of government and the 
opportunities to export to new markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Leaving the European Union (EU) undoubtedly represents the greatest change for the UK 
economy in a generation.  
It will impact the way we trade as well as the sources of investment and supply of workers. 
At the same time, by no longer being formally tied to EU rules, future UK economic, social, 
environmental and financial policy may look quite different.  
There remains considerable uncertainty about the costs and benefits of Brexit. Many of the 
changes will be hard to measure, whilst others will be spread out over a number of years. At 
the same time, how policymakers react – both in the UK and outside – will have an important 
bearing on outcomes. 
As with any change, there will be winners and losers. The risks and opportunities could look 
quite different for individual sectors and companies.  
The potential impacts on Scotland are our focus in this report. Scotland voted differently from 
the UK as a whole in the referendum. The complexities of the devolution settlement, and the 
different structures of the two economies, mean that it is hard to argue that the implications 
of Brexit will be uniform between Scotland and the UK.  
This report summaries the economic links between Scotland and the EU, and provides some 
background information on the links between Scotland and the EU by sector.   
The outline of the report is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief recap of the different 
‘types’ of Brexit that may emerge whilst in Section 3 we outline key economic issues that 
follow. In Section 4 we summarise the data on Scotland’s sectoral links with the EU.  
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2. What will Brexit look like? 
 
2.1 Background 
The 2016 EU referendum was based upon a yes-no question of whether or not the UK 
should remain a member of the EU. However, many of the details of what a leave vote might 
constitute were never specified prior to the vote. Indeed a number of key areas remain 
unresolved.  
The UK Government now has around 16 months to reach an agreement with the EU.  
In principle, this could be extended, but expectations are that any delay is unlikely1. In 
practice, agreement will be needed by autumn 2018 to allow for both EU and UK 
parliamentary approval.   
There are three important – and clearly linked – steps in this process.  
1. Firstly, the terms of exit need to be worked out. The European Commission’s position 
is that this needs resolved before all else. A deal on the UK’s outstanding budget 
liabilities will be key2 as well as the rights of EU27 citizens in the UK (and vice versa).    
 
2. Secondly, the period of transition to any new arrangement needs to be agreed. Many 
businesses have highlighted the importance of avoiding a cliff-edge in economic 
relations.  
 
3. Finally, the long-term relationship between the UK and the EU needs to be resolved. 
The focus will undoubtedly be on economic issues, however, there are also important 
political and social aspects to consider.  
 
2.2 The emerging signs of a framework – the UK Government’s preferred position 
In January 2017, the Prime Minister confirmed that the UK would not seek to retain 
membership of the Single Market3. Instead, the UK would look for some form of trade deal 
with the EU – perhaps a free trade arrangement (like the one the EU now has with Canada). 
The UK wishes to be able to pursue its own migration policies and trade deals. It wants to 
                                                          
1
 European Parliamentary elections are in May 2019 and may act as a hard-deadline for the negotiations.    
2
 Estimates vary over what a ‘fair share’ of the UK’s budget liabilities could be. Some have argued that it could be 
as much as £60bn. Whatever the sum agreed it is likely to be paid up over a number of years meaning that 
taxpayers will continue to make some form of contribution to the EU for a number of years yet. 
3
 www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech   
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take on responsibility for policy currently under the auspices of the European Commission 
and – in principle – no longer be subject to the European Court of Justice.  
This proposal is different from the ‘softest forms of Brexit’ discussed during the referendum.  
 
Table 2.1: Alternative models for the UK’s relationship with the EU 
 
EU  Norway  Switzerland Free Trade (e.g. 
Canada) 
Customs Union 
(e.g. Turkey) 
WTO 
Single market 
member Full Full 
 Partial No No No 
Tariffs None None  None Reduced/no tariffs 
None on 
industrial goods Yes 
Accept free 
movement Yes Yes 
 Yes No No No 
In the customs 
union Yes No 
 No No Yes No 
Makes EU budget 
contributions Yes Yes 
 Yes (smaller than 
Norway) No No No 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
If agreed, a free trade deal could mean that UK exports to and from the EU would not be 
subject to tariffs (or at the least be subject to much reduced tariffs). But non-tariff barriers are 
likely to exist.  
 
Box 2.1: Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers 
Tariff Barriers: A tax or duty paid on an import.  
Non-tariff Barriers (NTB):  Historically, these were quotas on the volume of trade that 
could take place. Nowadays they take on more opaque4 – but by no means insignificant – 
forms including:  
x Differences in product standards 
x Conformity assessments and supervisory arrangements  
x Rules of origin and customs formalities 
For example, outside the Single Market, an exporter selling to the EU has to prove they 
meet EU standards (which carries a cost). If the UK sets different standards, then in order 
to be sold in the EU, the exporter will have to alter their product (which carries a cost).  
                                                          
4
 For example, a country may set for certain household appliances a regulation covering the maximum noise 
permitted. Any product sold in that country must meet that criteria. In the Single Market, these are consistent 
across the EU. Therefore, a product made in the UK can be sold in another EU without having to meet – or prove 
that it has met – local standards.  
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The Great Repeal Bill will, initially, mean that EU regulations and standards will be retained. 
An attempt to ensure mutual recognition of standards to limit non-tariff barriers could be 
agreed longer term. But if the decision to leave the EU was in part motivated by a desire to 
take a different political path, UK and EU economic and regulatory policies will diverge over 
time.  
The UK Government has set out a desire to remain an associate member of the Customs 
Union. It is not exactly clear such an arrangement is workable. Indeed, it seems highly 
unlikely that should the UK wish to do trade deals with third countries, some form of ‘rules of 
origin’ checks will not be required5.  
What about trade with other countries?  
So far, the UK Government has stated that “to minimise disruption to global trade as we 
leave the EU, over the coming period the Government will prepare the necessary draft 
schedules which replicate as far as possible our current obligations”6.  
But by no longer being part of the EU, the UK could lose existing EU preferential trading 
deals with other countries (unless new deals could be arranged quickly)7. This includes 
growing markets such as the Republic of Korea.  
The UK Government has outlined an ambition for new trade deals. Formally they cannot 
negotiate with third countries until after the UK has left the EU.  
History has shown that such deals can be complex to negotiate8. In the EU context, the UK 
arguably starts from a privileged position. But the challenge will be how this relationship 
evolves and the political appetite to ‘do a deal’9.  
  
                                                          
5
 For example, suppose the UK signs a free trade deal with the EU and a similar arrangement with the US. 
Further suppose that the EU does not have a deal with the US. Without a customs border, a US product could be 
exported to the UK – facing no tariff (because of the US-UK trade deal) – and then onward shipped to the EU – 
again facing no tariff (because of the UK-EU trade deal). To avoid this, a bureaucratic check will be required.  
6
 House of Commons Written Statement by Dr Liam Fox (Secretary of State for International Trade) - 
www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Commons/2016-12-05/HCWS316/  
7
 See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/  
8
 The recent EU-Canada trade deal took seven years to negotiate. 
9
 For example, the interplay between the economic aspects of regulations and supervision on the one hand and 
thorny political issues, such as the role of the European Court of Justice, on the other. 
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2.3  The emerging signs of a framework – the no-deal position 
The other scenario is where no deal is reached. Should this happen, then there is the 
prospect of the UK entering the ‘hardest of Brexits’.  
Without an agreement, imports into the UK from the EU would be subject to WTO tariffs. 
Tariffs would also apply to UK exports to the EU10.  
While average EU tariffs are low, they are high for some products, especially in agriculture.  
Introducing tariffs would be a major economic shock, not just for the UK but the EU27. Trade 
would be impacted as would the complex web of supply chains (with tariffs perhaps being 
levied at numerous stages of the production process).  
Non-tariff barriers could become prohibitive if UK-based companies no longer automatically 
meet supervisory and regulatory standards.  
Of course, the UK would have the ability to manage migration levels from the EU27. And 
over time, the government could put in place its own regulatory, tax and trade policies.  
 
2.4 Scottish Government’s proposals for Scotland’s membership of the Single Market 
In December, the Scottish Government published their response to the EU referendum11.  
The centre piece was a proposal that Scotland remains in the Single Market even if the rest 
of the UK leaves. There has been much debate over whether or not this is possible.  
The EU has, in the past, shown some flexibility in accommodating solutions to unique 
circumstances12. That being said, the case of Scotland would be different in scale and 
complexity.  
1. Firstly, there are a number of legal hurdles. Remaining in the Single Market would 
require Scotland to comply with EU regulatory standards on goods, services and 
capital. The relevant legislative and fiscal powers would need to be devolved.  
 
2. Secondly, there are a number of practical economic challenges. For example, if 
Scotland was to have a different trading relationship with the EU vis-à-vis the UK, 
then Scotland’s trading relationship with the rest of the UK could change. Even the 
Scottish Government’s preferred approach of ‘inside the EU Single Market and the 
                                                          
10
 For the UK’s trade with non-EU countries, there would be no change to tariffs. 
11
 See www.gov.scot/Publications/2016/12/9234  
12
  For example, East Germany post German reunification and granting Greenland a more detached status 
following devolution from Denmark 
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UK Custom Union’, could create frictions in terms of regulatory, product and 
employment standards.   
 
3. Thirdly, processes would need to be established to cope with different rules for free 
movement.  In effect, EU27 citizens could live and work in Scotland but not 
elsewhere in the UK. In reality, a ‘physical’ border may not be needed but some form 
of checks – through employment contracts or tax records – might be required.  
Trade with the UK – whatever the constitutional settlement – is important (see Chart 2.1), 
with around two thirds of Scottish exports bound for the rest of the UK.   
 
Chart 2.1: Scottish exports by destination – 2002 to 2015 
 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics 
 
In summary, a differentiated arrangement is possible but would not be easy. Ultimately, it will 
depend upon political will, in Scotland, the UK and the EU2713. The prospects of a separate 
deal for Scotland seems to have slipped off the political agenda in recent months. 
  
                                                          
13
 It should be noted that the estimates of rUK exports includes exports from Scotland to the UK Continental 
Shelf. Scottish mining and quarrying exports to rUk is around £3 billion – a significant amount of which will be 
activity supporting Scotland’s oil and gas industry (arguably inflating the rUK figure to a level higher than it should 
be).  
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3. Brexit: through what channels could it impact? 
 
3.1 Background  
The majority of economists predict that leaving the EU will act as a headwind for the UK’s 
long-term economic prospects. 
Those in favour of Brexit have tended to argue that the impacts could be smaller than those 
predicted by the mainstream view and that new opportunities – from more localised policy 
making, a re-orientating of international trade agreements and reducing the (perceived) 
negative impact of EU migration – could outweigh the risks.  
Information is scarce on how leaving the EU will actually impact different parts of the 
Scottish economy. The lack of data – and the limited clarity on what a ‘deal’ may look like – 
are the two key reasons for this.   
We identify five broad channels through which Brexit could have an impact on the Scottish 
economy –  
• Trade; 
• Inward investment; 
• The labour market – including migration;  
• Budget contributions; and,  
• The policy and regulatory environment.  
 
3.2 Future trading relationships 
The EU is Scotland’s principal international trading partner.  
In 2015, Scotland exported £12.3 billion of goods and services to the EU – equivalent to over 
40 per cent of Scottish international exports (16 per cent of total exports when rUK exports 
are included).   
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Chart 3.1: Scottish exports by destination - 2015 
 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics 
 
 
The EU is an important international market for Scottish firms, particularly given that 
successive Scottish administrations have had an ambition to compete more successfully 
internationally14.  
How do we compare to other parts of the UK? HMRC publish data on goods for Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and the English regions15.  
One technical issue with the HMRC approach is that it allocates to Scotland all oil directly 
exported from platforms in Scottish waters. This has a significant impact on the Scottish 
series, making it difficult to isolate trends in the on- and off-shore economies.   
On balance, even with oil included, Scotland appears to rely relatively less on EU trade than 
other parts of the UK as a market for its total exports16. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this including geography and the fact that a major export – Scotch whisky – 
is a global product.   
 
                                                          
14
 See Gregor Irwin’s analysis here www.global-counsel.co.uk/blog/scotland%E2%80%99s-%C2%A312bn-
export-gap  
15
 It should be noted that HMRC use a different methodology to the Scottish Government both in terms of the way 
in which the data is collected and presented. Direct comparisons should be undertaken with caution.  
16
 Note: the quarterly regional data can be subject to change so point estimates may change depending upon 
when the data is accessed. However, the key trends remain broadly consistent.   
Rest of the UK 
63%
EU
16%
Non-EU
21%
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Chart 3.2: EU exports/imports by devolved nation and English region - % of total 
international exports/import to/from the EU Q2 2016 to Q1 2017 
 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
 
If we exclude mineral, fuels, lubricants and related materials – which includes refined 
petroleum activities and direct oil exports – the ratio of EU to total international exports is 
lower still17.  
As already highlighted, the UK could in principle strike new trade deals with non-EU 
countries. But this needs to be put in context:  
1. Agreeing new deals is not straightforward – as recent discussions on an EU-US trade 
deal have demonstrated.  
  
2. Trade deals – unlike a Single Market – do not always guarantee similar rights, 
regulations or standards.  
 
3. The EU is by far the largest source of international trade for Scotland – exports here 
are worth more than those to North America, Asia, South America and the Middle 
East combined.  
 
  
                                                          
17
 This is not to say that such exports are not important, but instead to highlight how this one sector – which is 
more significant in Scotland than elsewhere in the UK – has an impact on the results.  
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Chart 3.3: Scottish Exports to key destinations 
 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics 
 
It is also worth noting that Norway and Switzerland – two countries in the top ten of market 
destinations for Scottish exports – are covered either by conditions of the European 
Economic Area or the EU-Switzerland FTA and associated bi-lateral agreements. 
Arrangements will be required to retain preferential terms once the UK leaves the EU.  
 
Table 3.1: Top ten export destinations, 2015, (£ million) 
Rank Destination Total Exports (£ m) % of Total 
1 USA 4,560 15.9 
2 Netherlands 2,295 8.0 
3 France 1,810 6.3 
4 Germany 1,750 6.1 
5 Norway 1,315 4.6 
6 Denmark 1,085 3.8 
7 Ireland 1,010 3.5 
8 Spain 830 2.9 
9 Switzerland 785 2.7 
10 Brazil 750 2.6 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics 
 
3.3 Inward investment  
According to OECD and EY’s Global Investment Monitor data, the UK has been the largest 
recipient of investment in the EU since the establishment of the EU Single Market.  
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
EU Rest of Europe N America C & S America Middle East Asia Africa Australasia
£ 
m
illi
on
Brexit and the sectors of the Scottish economy 
  
13 
 
In recent years, Scotland has been particularly successful at attracting such investment – 
ranking second in the UK in terms of projects secured during the last five years. But in terms 
of jobs supported, in 2016, Scotland was ranked sixth out of twelve. 
  
Chart 3.4: Inward investment projects secured: Scotland 2007 to 2016 
 
 
Source: EY Attractiveness Survey: Scotland 2017 
 
Leading sectors for such investment typically are a diverse mix of services, construction and 
manufacturing.  
How important is EU membership to such investment? Some of Scotland’s advantages have 
little to do with the EU. That English is the language of commerce is clearly an advantage. 
And the UK’s legal and regulatory system makes it relatively easy for investors. Scotland’s 
skilled workforce, infrastructure and business networks are also seen as vital assets.  
But the EU is believed to have been at least part of the story.  
Some evidence can be drawn from surveys. EY’s 2017 ‘UK attractiveness survey‘ suggests 
that in the 2016 survey, 78 per cent of investors in the UK considered access to the 
European markets as important to the UK’s attractiveness. That figure fell to 50 per cent in 
the most recent survey. There has also been a rise in the number of respondents believing 
that the UK’s attractiveness will decline over the next three years.  
There are around 1,000 enterprises in Scotland where the parent company is from another 
EU country – employing around 130,000 people.  
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Table 3.2: Scottish employment by EU-owned enterprises 2016 
Enterprise Ownership Scottish Employment Number of Enterprises 
Scotland 1,261,960 168,895 
RUK 340,400 2,790 
ROW 189,760 1,305 
EU 127,110 1,000 
Source: Scottish Government, Businesses in Scotland 
 
 
3.4 The labour market  
There were around 180,000 EU nationals living in Scotland in 201518 19.  
This was equivalent to around 3.4 per cent of the total population, which is slightly lower than 
for the UK as a whole (where non-UK EU nationals represented 5.4 per cent of the 
population).  
Half of the net increase in the Scottish population between 2000 and 2015 has come from 
people born in EU countries20.  
Scotland faces a more challenging demographic situation compared to the UK as a whole.  
Since 1978, Scotland has experienced lower fertility rates than the UK and has had 
improving but lower longevity than the UK. This means that it is relatively more dependent 
upon the inflow of people for population growth.  
The 2014-based population projections forecast a 7 per cent rise in Scotland’s population as 
a whole over the coming decades. These numbers are premised on sustaining current levels 
of net migration. For Scotland this implies continued international net migration of around 
9,500 per year. With zero net migration, Scotland’s population is projected to decline by 2.5 
per cent, while the UK population would still grow, albeit at a much slower rate of 5 per cent.  
 
  
                                                          
18
 See www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Labour-Market/Publications/EUnationalsEXCEL. Since this report 
was finalised, the Scottish Government has published an updated analysis for 2016 – available here:  
www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00527186.pdf  
19
 The statistics presented here are based upon nationality. Statistics are also available according to ‘country of 
birth’. Estimates of EU nationals based upon on reported nationality are lower than those based on country of 
birth – 181,000 vs. 190,000 in 2015.  
20
 Source: www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-
86_EU_nationals_living_in_Scotland.pdf  
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Chart 3.5: Scottish and UK population change under different scenarios 
 
Source: 2014-based ONS population projections 
 
The Scottish population is also ageing. Estimates for the year to the end of June 2016 show 
that the proportion of the population aged under sixteen is now smaller (17 per cent) than 
that aged sixty five or over (18 per cent).  
EU migration has helped, in part, to mitigate the process of population ageing – EU migrants 
coming to Scotland tend to have a younger age profile compared with the Scottish 
population21.  
 
3.5 Budget contributions  
Alongside migration, a key issue – particularly for leave voters – was the argument that 
Brexit could save the UK money from no longer making EU budget payments.  
There are two important aspects to this.  
Firstly, it is far from clear that any savings will be as great as many have hoped. Once 
account is made of the money received from the EU – e.g. University research grants – the 
UK’s net contribution is smaller than many believe. Moreover, if the economy grows more 
slowly post-Brexit, this may worsen the deficit through lower tax receipts and higher social 
security spending.   
                                                          
21
 80% of EU nationals in Scotland are of working age, compared to 65% for the Scottish population as a whole. 
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Secondly, some fiscal competences currently exercised at EU level might be repatriated to 
the Scottish Parliament post-Brexit22. These include:  
x Agriculture including support for farmers and rural policy; 
x Fisheries within the Scottish zone and Scottish boats outside it; 
x Environmental regulation; and 
x Regional policy including industry support and economic development; 
 
From a Scottish budget perspective, a key as yet unresolved issue relates to the funding of 
any of these powers if they are transferred to Holyrood. In the first instance, EU funding 
would revert to Westminster.  
The monies involved are not insignificant – for example Scotland’s share of EU Structural 
Funds (for 2014-20) amount to around €1 billion23.   
 
Chart 3.6: Scotland’s share of UK 2014-20 EU funding 
 
Source: Scottish Parliament Research Centre 
 
                                                          
22
 A complication is that the international dimensions of ‘non-reserved’ policy are always reserved (e.g. whilst 
agricultural policy is not reserved, issues relating to agricultural trade are). 
23
 See https://beta.gov.scot/policies/european-structural-funds/  
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3.6 The policy and regulatory environment.  
The Single Market is underpinned by a suite of rules and regulations covering diverse areas 
such as employee rights, environmental standards, procurement and state aid.  
The ‘Great Repeal Bill’ will convert all existing EU-derived law into domestic law. What 
happens next will be crucial. A number of issues are worthy of note.  
1. As highlighted above, non-tariff barriers can be a significant impediment to trade in 
many sectors. If the UK takes a different path to the EU – e.g. in product safety 
standards – this would come at the expense of access to EU markets. 
 
2. Brexit might remove constraints imposed by State Aid rules, enabling government to 
support industries in ways in which they currently cannot. Any trade deal with the EU 
is, however, likely to require some agreement to coordinate – at least in part – State 
Aid rules24.  
 
3. Finally, the scope for the UK to take a radically different path is open to question. The 
UK is already estimated to have the second lowest level of product regulation in the 
OECD and be only behind New Zealand, the US and Canada in terms of how flexible 
(or lax depending upon your viewpoint) employment protection rights are25,26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 EEA members effectively agree to EU State Aid rules, and WTO rules include anti-subsidy measures. 
25
 https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=PMR  
26
 www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm  
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4. EU links by sector 
In this section of the report, we outline current links between different sectors of the Scottish 
economy and trade with the EU.   
It should be noted that the data availability of Scottish trade to the EU and wider economic 
links is largely under-developed. What we do in this section, is make the best use of the 
information and sources are available. The data and modelling contained here should in our 
view be interpreted as providing an illustrative overview of trends.   
 
4.1 Scottish EU trade by sector 
Table 4.1 shows the value of EU exports based upon the Export Statistics Scotland data – 
see Box 4.1 for an overview of available statistics on Scottish exports.   
Manufacturing makes up the majority of Scottish trade with the EU. In 2015, just over 60 per 
cent of Scottish trade with the EU was from manufacturing27.  
Table 4.1: Scottish EU exports by sector 
  
EU Rank 
Total  12,305  
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 105 21 
Mining and Quarrying 615 7 
Manufacturing  
 
Food & beverages 1,830 2 
    Of Which Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits  1,190  
Textiles, leather and related products 210 16= 
Wood and paper products; and printing 325 12= 
Coke, refined petroleum and chemical products 2,320 1 
Basic metals and fabricated metal  325 12= 
Computer, electronic and optical products 595 8 
Machinery and equipment  625 6 
Transport equipment 185 19 
Furniture, other manufacturing; repair and installation  200 18 
Other 870 5 
Total Manufacturing 7,480  
Utilities 175 20 
Construction 50 22 
Services  
 
Wholesale, retail trade; repair of vehicles  1,070 3 
Transportation and storage 430 9 
Information and communication 345 10 
Financial and insurance activities 210 16= 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 980 4 
Administrative and support service activities 335 11 
Education 285 14 
Other Services 225 15 
Total Services 3,880  
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics Scotland 
                                                          
27
 For the purposes of this paper we use the classifications provided in official government publications. In 
practice, there is cross-over between what is manufacturing and what is classified as a service.  
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In terms of the value of exports, the most significant sectors are those associated with 
refined petroleum and chemical activities and food and drink (of which whisky and linked 
products like white spirit) are the largest.  
Although goods make up the majority of trade, there are some important sectors in services 
including wholesale and retail and professional service activities.  
Box 4.1: Estimating Scottish exports 
There are two main sources of export statistics data for Scotland.  
1. Export Statistics Scotland – published by the Scottish Government; 
2. UK Regional Trade Statistics – published by HMRC (for goods) and the ONS (for 
services).  
Export Statistics Scotland (ESS) is based upon a survey – the Global Connections 
Survey28.  
The UK regional statistics produced by HMRC and ONS are based upon different 
methodologies. They take UK-wide data and apportion it according to business address. 
Where a firm has multiple locations, an employment share is used.  
The ESS is currently the preferred source as it covers both services and goods and is 
based upon a direct assessment of activity.  
The HMRC and ONS data have the advantage of consistency across the UK. The HMRC 
allocates oil exports from North Sea platforms to the ‘region’ where it is located – 
significantly influencing the Scottish figures. But overall, it is much improved.  
The ONS data is experimental.   
All three datasets use the final destination market. Therefore, even if a Scottish product 
leaves from a port elsewhere in the UK they will still be counted as a ‘Scottish export’. 
However, they do not monitor cross border flows of complex supply chains.  
 
In looking at the relative importance of the EU market, some interesting features are evident.  
As Table 4.2 highlights, around 63 per cent of total Scottish exports are destined for markets 
elsewhere in the UK. However, in manufacturing, international exports (non-EU and EU 
combined) are more important. Unsurprisingly, in services there is less international trade. 
For utilities and construction the percentages are lower still.  
                                                          
28
 www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_17-14_Scotlands_Exports.pdf  
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Table 4.2: Share of Scottish exports by destination 
  
RUK Non-EU EU 
Total 63% 21% 16% 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 72% 16% 12% 
Mining and Quarrying 60% 29% 12% 
Manufacturing 
      
Food products, beverages and tobacco products 46% 34% 21% 
    Of Which Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits  13% 60% 27% 
Textiles, leather and related products 43% 24% 33% 
Coke, refined petroleum and chemical products 31% 11% 58% 
Pharmaceutical products 24% 37% 39% 
Rubber, plastic and other non-metallic mineral products 41% 19% 40% 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery 53% 25% 22% 
Computer, electronic and optical products 27% 37% 36% 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c 29% 39% 32% 
Total Manufacturing 43% 29% 28% 
Utilities 95% 2% 3% 
Construction 93% 3% 3% 
Services 
      
Wholesale, retail trade; repair of vehicles 80% 7% 13% 
Transportation and storage 76% 11% 13% 
Accommodation and food service activities 64% 19% 17% 
Information and communication 65% 25% 10% 
Financial and insurance activities 86% 12% 2% 
Real estate activities 75% 15% 10% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 56% 32% 12% 
Administrative and support service activities 70% 22% 8% 
Education 40% 38% 22% 
Total Services 72% 18% 10% 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics Scotland 
 
EU exports equate to only 10 per cent of exports from the service sector. But this figure rises 
to nearly 30 per cent for manufacturing.  
Sectors where the EU share of exports appears to be particularly important include refined 
petroleum and associated sectors, pharmaceutical and computer and electronic products. 
These latter exports are likely to be driven – in part – by pan-EU supply chains.  
Next by focussing in solely on international exports we can explore this a little further – see 
Chart 4.1 for manufacturing.  
This will determine, in part, the scope for sectors to take advantage of new markets.  
The average share of international exports bound for the EU in 2015 was around 50 per 
cent.  
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Chart 4.1: Share of total sector international exports by EU or ROW: Scotland 2015 
 
Source: Scottish Government Export Statistics Scotland 
 
Again, the relative importance of EU markets is not uniform. For example, in the coke, 
refined petroleum and chemical products sector over 80 per cent of international exports are 
currently to the EU. In contrast, for food and drink – particularly companies in the spirits 
industry – the ratio is lower at around 40 per cent.   
In summary, access to EU markets makes up a substantial proportion of the overall export 
base, although there are differences by sector.   
 
4.2 Employment supported by export demand by sector 
There are no actual data on employment supported by EU exports for Scotland.  
But using some of the information set out above, it is possible to provide an approximate 
estimate of the number of jobs in Scotland linked to the demand for exports from the EU 
(and other export markets).  
This is important, as different parts of the economy will have deeper/shallower linkages into 
the local economy and/or more spill-overs than others.  
For example on its own, the coke, refined petroleum and chemical products sector generates 
a significant amount of output and value added. But its activity is largely self-contained – 
particularly in comparison to other sectors like retail and wholesale.  
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There are different methodologies that can be employed to gain an understanding of the 
wider employment levels supported by export demand.  We adopt one here.  
To undertake this analysis, we use data published by the Scottish Government in their most 
recent input output tables – for 2014 – and the export information published in Export 
Statistics Scotland.  
Box 4.2 sets out the methodology. Table 4.3 summarises the headline results29.  
 
Table 4.3: Scottish employment supported by external demand, 2014 
  
Non-resident 
households30 EU exports 
Non-EU 
exports rUK exports Total 
Direct Employment 51,500 80,300 115,500 337,300 584,600 
Indirect Employment 8,200 33,000 49,700 144,200 235,200 
Induced Employment 6,900 21,100 30,500 82,700 141,100 
Total 66,500 134,400 195,700 564,200 960,900 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
According to the methodology set out in Box 4.2, it is estimated that around 560,000 jobs in 
Scotland are supported by demand for our goods and services from the rest of the UK.  
Around 134,000 jobs are supported by export demand from the rest of the EU, and slightly 
under 196,000 jobs are supported by export demand from the rest of the world. 
We can convert these numbers into shares of total employment in Scotland using comparable 
data – again from the Scottish Government input-output tables.  
Putting this all together shows that in 2014, 24.6 per cent of Scotland’s employment 
(excluding public sector administration and defence) was supported by trade with the rest of 
the UK (RUK).  
The equivalent number for trade with the rest of the EU (REU) was 5.9 per cent and for the 
rest of the world (ROW) was 8.5 per cent.  
The table below gives the shares of Scottish employment supported by demand from each 
source, in 2014, by type of employment effect. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 All results rounded to the nearest 100. Totals may not sum because of rounding.  
30
 Non-resident households refers effectively to tourist spending in Scotland (which is classified as an export).  
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Table 4.4: Total Scottish employment supported by each source of external demand, 2014 
  
Non-resident 
households EU exports 
Non-EU 
exports rUK exports 
Direct Employment 2.2% 3.5% 5.0% 14.7% 
Indirect Employment 0.4% 1.4% 2.2% 6.3% 
Induced Employment 0.3% 0.9% 1.3% 3.6% 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
Box 4.2: Methodology 
We use the most recent (2014) input-output tables for Scotland31.  
Economic input-output tables provide a complete picture of the flows of goods and services 
(products) in the economy. They detail the relationship between producers and consumers 
and track the interdependencies of industries. They are constructed from survey and other 
data sources and provide the most accurate and comprehensive picture of the national 
economy available.  
Given the scale of resources that goes into their compilation, the data are typically published 
with a lag.  
Using these data, we can attribute jobs to RUK export demand from the information in the 
tables themselves by sector and applying the appropriate employment effects.  
For trade with the rest of the EU, we have to first disaggregate the information on export 
demand from the rest of the world. This is done using Export Statistics Scotland (ESS) data 
produced by the Scottish Government32. We use the sectoral shares of export demand 
based on 2014 in 2015 ESS, and then constrain the totals to the 2014 Scottish input-output 
data.  
As with all such estimates and methodologies, different assumptions etc. will impact on the 
final estimates. In particular, it should be noted that the figures for ROW exports (and RUK 
exports) in the IO tables differ from those in ESS.  
Having disaggregated ROW export demand from the input-output tables into demand from 
the rest of the EU and the rest of the world, we apply sectoral employment effects from the 
input-output tables as we did for RUK trade. 
 
                                                          
31
 www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Input-Output/Downloads/IO1998-2014Latest  
32
 www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/Exports/ESSPublication/ESSExcel 
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Table 4.5 looks in more detail at a sectoral level, and we can see the sectors where Scotland’s 
export demands supports employment.   
 
Table 4.5: Sectoral breakdown of jobs supported by export demand33 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
Table 4.6 breaks this down further. Again, we stress the importance of focusing on relative 
scale and patterns rather than point estimates. The grouping is slightly different to the above 
to help with aggregation (and consistent with those in the Scottish GDP publication). 
 
Table 4.6: Sectoral breakdown of jobs supported by export demand 
  
Non-
resident 
households EU Non-EU rUK 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 900 4,400 5,400 20,900 
Mining and Quarrying 200 2,000 5,000 36,700 
          
Manufacturing 
        
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 400 12,800 17,200 42,300 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather Products 200 2,200 1,700 3,400 
Refined Petroleum, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products 100 6,800 2,300 7,200 
Metals, Metal Products & Machinery n.e.c. 200 11,300 12,200 14,400 
Computer, Electrical & Optical Products 0 6,000 7,100 7,700 
Transport Equipment 0 1,400 7,800 10,300 
Other Manufacturing Industries; Repair & Installation 400 9,300 10,800 27,200 
Total Manufacturing 1,300 49,800 59,000 112,600 
Utilities 100 2,500 1,300 15,000 
Construction 200 2,800 3,200 23,700 
Services 
        
Distribution, Hotels and Catering 53,900 22,100 14,700 34,900 
Transport, Storage and Communication 5,100 10,100 16,800 62,600 
Business Services and Finance 1,500 28,700 72,600 226,200 
Government, and Other Services 3,500 12,100 17,700 31,500 
Total Services 64,000 72,900 121,800 355,300 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
                                                          
33
 Note- the totals in this table do not exactly match those in Table 4.6 due to rounding. 
    
Non-resident 
households 
EU Non-EU rUK 
Agriculture & Mining 1,100 6,400 10,400 57,600 
Manufacturing, Utilities and Construction 1,500 55,100 63,500 151,400 
Services   64,000 72,900 121,800 355,300 
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Not only does this table capture differences in terms of export shares, but it also captures 
differences in multipliers and linkages to the local economy.  
For example, whilst in terms of value the refined petroleum, chemical and pharmaceutical 
products sector had the greatest EU market in terms of estimated jobs supported, other 
sectors such as machinery and food and drink are estimated – under this methodology – to 
ultimately support a higher number of jobs.  
Other big sectors include many key manufacturing sectors. Like metals and electrical 
manufacturing.  
In services, the onward jobs supported tend to be higher than for manufacturing, reflecting the 
different values of multipliers in these sectors – e.g. in distribution and hotels and catering. 
Two qualifications are worth noting.  
Firstly, a large number of the jobs supported in wholesale and retail will actually be tied to 
other sectors.  
Secondly, the figure for non-residents households for distribution, hotels and catering reflects 
the fact that there is only limited data on EU and overseas visitors and they are captured by 
the term non-resident households. This is, therefore, likely to underestimate EU and 
international figures – see Box 4.3 for more.   
Box 4.3: Non-residents households 
In the above analysis, we do not attempt to disentangle spending by non-resident 
households by country of origin. 
For the most part, this is a reasonable assumption as the magnitudes from the classification 
are quite low. Arguably, the one exception to that is in tourist activities where a significant 
proportion of such ‘export’ demand will be apportioned to this ‘non-resident households’ 
category rather than to RUK, REU or ROW.  
For completeness, the following table summarises the key data on tourist activity in 
Scotland.  
Table 4.7: Tourist numbers and spend Scotland 2015 and 2016 
  
 Visits (000s) Spend (£m) 
  
 2015 2016 2015 2016 
EU28 
Holiday 805 714 528 429 
Business 275 278 105 91 
Visiting friends or relatives 285 399 84 124 
Miscellaneous 46 34 68 48 
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All visits 1,411 1,425 785 692 
World 
Holiday 1,454 1,471 1,081 1,178 
Business 427 413 204 204 
Visiting friends or relatives 606 782 288 349 
Miscellaneous 106 81 124 119 
All visits 2,592 2,747 1,695 1,850 
EU Share 
Holiday 55.4% 48.5% 48.8% 36.4% 
Business 64.5% 67.4% 51.6% 44.9% 
Visiting friends or relatives 47.0% 51.0% 29.3% 35.6% 
Miscellaneous 43.3% 42.1% 54.7% 40.2% 
All visits 54.5% 51.9% 46.3% 37.4% 
Source: Scottish Government  
 
One final piece of analysis is to compare the direct jobs in the sector approximately supported 
by EU demand with total employment – Table 4.8.  
 
Table 4.8: Share of total employment accounted for by direct EU export employment 
  
Direct EU 
Export 
Employment 
Total Sector 
Employment % 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 3,000 55,500 5.4% 
Mining and Quarrying 1,000 28,900 3.6% 
Manufacturing    
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 5,800 47,900 12.1% 
Textiles, Clothing & Leather Products 1,400 7,800 18.4% 
Refined Petroleum, Chemical & Pharmaceutical Products 3,100 11,100 27.5% 
Metals, Metal Products & Machinery n.e.c. 6,600 41,300 16.0% 
Computer, Electrical & Optical Products 3,500 16,200 21.3% 
Transport Equipment 500 12,300 4.4% 
Other Manufacturing Industries; Repair & Installation 5,300 56,500 9.3% 
Total Manufacturing 26,100 193,200 13.5% 
Utilities 1,100 32,700 3.5% 
Construction 1,500 159,900 0.9% 
Services    
Distribution, Hotels and Catering 13,900 448,600 3.1% 
Transport, Storage and Communication 6, 200 170,000 3.6% 
Business Services and Finance 18,000 433,900 4.1% 
Government, and Other Services 9,500 655,800 1.4% 
Total Services 47,500 1,708,300 2.8% 
Source: Fraser of Allander 
 
Here we see that in certain manufacturing sectors, a relatively high proportion of jobs in the 
sector are estimated to be supported by EU demand.  
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4.3 How different is Scotland to the UK? 
Chart 4.2 examines the relative share of EU exports in total exports of goods between 
Scotland and the UK according to the latest HMRC data (note this excludes services).  
 
Chart 4.2: Exports Destined for the EU as a % of Total Exports – Scotland and the UK 
 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
 
Overall, there are not many significant differences between Scotland and the rest of the UK. 
But there are some variations, for example machinery and transport equipment – including 
the production of cars – are more important at the UK level.  
It is possible to go a level below this and to look at some of the sub-sectors. Table 4.9 lists 
the top ten Scottish exports to the EU and then compares where the sector ranks for the UK.  
It also shows the proportion of total exports in the sector that are accounted for by EU sales. 
Finally, the table shows the proportion of total Scottish exports that are accounted for by EU 
trade by this sector.  
Some care should be taken when interpreting these results as they will – in part – be 
influenced by the categorisation of the sixty six sectors. But they still provide useful 
comparisons.  
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Table 4.9: Top ten Scottish exports to EU – by value and UK rank – Q2 2016 to Q1 2017 
  Scotland UK 
  
EU 
Export 
Rank 
EU Exports 
% of Total 
Sector 
Exports 
% of Total 
Scottish 
Exports 
EU Export 
Rank 
Petroleum & related materials 1 4,473,779 75.3% 16.6% 2 
Beverages 2 1,001,401 30.6% 3.7% 19 
Fish & crustaceans 3 633,046 78.1% 2.4% 31 
General industrial machinery 4 509,904 37.8% 1.9% 6 
Office machines & adp machines 5 499,714 75.7% 1.9% 11 
Electronic machinery & appliances 6 405,963 48.4% 1.5% 7 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 7 384,593 65.0% 1.4% 4 
Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 8 363,117 24.4% 1.3% 5 
Power generating machinery & equipment 9 300,387 10.2% 1.1% 8 
Gas, natural & manufactured 10 277,252 88.5% 1.0% 22 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
 
The table highlights some differences in terms of ranking by sector in terms of value over the 
year Q2 2016 to Q1 2017. For example, the relative importance of Scotland’s beverages and 
fishing sectors are clearly evident. 
There are however, a lot of similarities particularly in manufacturing.  
Table 4.10 shows that the difference in relative importance is reciprocal. Here we rank top 
UK exports to the EU and compare where these same sectors rank for Scotland.   
 
Chart 4.10: Top ten UK exports to EU – by value and Scottish rank 
  UK Scotland 
  
EU 
Export 
Rank 
EU Exports 
% of Total 
Sector 
Exports 
% of Total 
UK 
Exports 
EU Export 
Rank 
Road vehicles 1 17,877,413 46.5% 6.4% 26 
Petroleum & related materials 2 11,387,480 63.0% 4.1% 1 
Other transport equipment 3 8,247,595 46.5% 2.9% 24 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4 7,822,835 42.6% 2.8% 7 
Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 5 6,744,326 35.3% 2.4% 8 
General industrial machinery 6 5,887,032 47.4% 2.1% 4 
Electronic machinery & appliances 7 5,787,197 49.1% 2.1% 6 
Power generating machinery & equipment 8 4,763,585 20.9% 1.7% 9 
Fashion, clothing & accessories 9 4,584,727 77.7% 1.6% 13 
Telecomms 10 3,540,460 52.6% 1.3% 19 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
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Next we look at the ONS experimental data on services exports for Scotland – summarised 
in Chart 4.334. The biggest service sectors are ones tied to manufacturing and information 
and communication.  
 
Chart 4.3: EU and ROW Service Exports from Scotland 2015 
 
Source: ONS Regional Services Export Statistics 
 
Box 4.4: HMRC Treatment of Mineral Fuels, lubricants and related materials 
The HMRC Regional Trade Statistics are based upon an apportionment of total UK trade 
to the twelve Government Office Regions of the UK.  
The UK exports a lot of oil-related activities, primarily to Europe. This includes output 
directly from oil platforms in the North Sea.  
In the past, these exports were allocated to an ‘unknown region’. Now they are allocated 
the exports to the location of oil installation. This means that all oil exports from rigs in 
Scottish waters enter into the Scottish series.  
This significantly alters the results. Most countries – including Norway – with substantial oil 
and gas sectors separate their accounts into onshore and offshore. 
The chart below shows the impact on the Scottish data.  
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Chart 4.4: Mineral fuels lubricants and related materials – Scotland and unknown region 
 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
 
The chart below provides a slightly more detailed breakdown of total exports going to the 
EU.  
 
Chart 4.5: % of Service Exports from Scotland & GB to EU, by industry - 2015  
 
Source: ONS Regional Services Export Statistics 
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In the main, the relative importance of EU services exports by sector is similar to that for the 
UK as a whole. There are differences, in particular the importance of the EU market in the 
professional, scientific and technical category.  
 
4.4 What about imports? 
The final thing to look at is imports.  
There is a common misconception that imports are bad for the economy, whereas exports 
are good. But imports also generate economic activity. Indeed, imports are often essential to 
the production of goods, which are ultimately exported.  
Unfortunately, the data on Scottish imports from the EU is sparse.  
HMRC do provide an estimate of goods imports based upon the location of the firm 
importing.  
Chart 4.6 shows the proportion of total international imports from the EU.  
Overall, there is little variation between Scotland and the UK. The key import activity is in 
machinery and transport equipment.  
 
Chart 4.6: Goods Imports by industry – Scotland and the UK, 2016Q2 to 2017Q1 – share of 
total imports accounted for by EU imports 
 
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics 
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4.5 What else might have an impact? 
If the UK and EU trade relationship reverts to a WTO-type framework, then what will matter 
for a sector is the likelihood that it will face barriers to trade.  
A sector in Scotland may be relatively relaxed provided that they face low – or even zero – 
tariffs. Of course, that would still not remove non-tariff barriers or challenges from being 
outside the Customs Union.  
Table 4.11 summarises some select tariffs imposed by the EU by product.   
 
Table 4.11: EU Tariffs by product type (%) 
Good Average Tariff (%) 
Animal Products 15.0 
Dairy Products 33.5 
Fruit, vegetable and plants 10.3 
Pharmaceuticals 0.0 
Coffee and tea 6.0 
Cereals and preparations 12.4 
Sugars and confectionary 20.2 
Beverages and tobacco 19.4 
Other agricultural products 3.2 
Fish and fish products 12.0 
Minerals and metals 2.0 
Petroleum 2.5 
Chemicals 4.5 
Wood, paper etc 0.9 
Textiles 6.5 
Clothing 11.4 
Leather, footwear etc. 4.1 
Non-electrical machinery 1.9 
Electrical machinery 2.8 
Transport equipment 4.3 
Source: WTO World Tariff Profiles 2016 
 
The above table is an aggregate. Within individual product groups, the exact tariff could vary 
significantly. For example, the upper bound can be as high as 22% on some transport 
equipment. In agriculture, they can be as high as 87 per cent for frozen beef to as low as 3.8 
per cent on whole, fresh, sweet potatoes. 
Information on non-tariff barriers is harder to ascertain. For example, a key one in the 
Scottish context will undoubtedly be passporting rights for financial services.  
Mutual recognition of standards will also be vital for many producers. Similarly, some sectors 
– particularly those plugged into a supply chain – will be more susceptible to costs 
associated with rules of origin.  
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The final point is that trade with the EU is only one channel through which Brexit may have 
an impact on Scotland. 
Our analysis published in October 2016, highlighted how it was important to consider 
Scotland’s trade relationships with the UK. Any Brexit shock to the rUK economy will spill-
over into the Scottish economy35.  
To assess these long-term implications, we used our macroeconomic model of Scotland 
economy to capture all such channels – Chart 4.7. 
 
Chart 4.7: Percentage change in long-run GDP in Scotland and RUK in the WTO Scenario 
 
Source: FAI analysis  
 
4.6 EU nationals by sector36 
In 2015, there were 115,000 non-UK EU nationals aged 16 and over in employment in 
Scotland – around 4.5 per cent of total employment.  
Table 4.12 summarises some key statistics on EU nationals in Scotland.  
 
 
                                                          
35
 https://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/feeds/news.aspx?id=1057  
36
 All the data in this section of the report are from the APS for 2015.  
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Table 4.12: Non-UK EU Nationals and other non-EU nationals in Scotland, 2015 
  Non-UK EU Nationals All Scotland 
  
  
Total population (000's) 181 5,282 
% of total population 3.4 100 
Number of working age adults  145 3,417 
% of all working age adults in Scotland 4.2 100.0 
By age band (%)   
<16 16.4 17.0 
16-24 14.0 11.5 
25-34 33.5 13.2 
35-49 24.5 19.8 
50-64 7.8 20.2 
65+ 3.8 18.3 
Economic Activity   
Employment (16-64) rate 78.9% 73.1% 
Unemployment (16+) rate 6.0% 5.8% 
Inactivity (16-64) rate 16.2% 22.3% 
% of all    
In employment 4.5 100.0 
Source: Annual Population Survey 
 
The employment rate for non-UK EU nationals (78.9 per cent in 2015) is higher than for 
Scotland as a whole (73.1 per cent in 2015).  
The chart below shows two things –  
x The percentage of non-UK EU nationals workforce employed in each industry;  
x The percentage of all non-UK EU nationals in employment by industry.    
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Chart 4.8: Non-UK EU Nationals % of employment by sector, 2015 
 
Source: Annual Population Survey 
 
In total, non-UK EU nationals account for 4.5 per cent of all employment in Scotland in 2015.  
For non-UK EU nationals (aged 16 and over), the main industries of employment are in 
distribution, hotels and restaurants where 28.6 per cent of all non-EU UK nationals were 
employed – equivalent to 6.9 per cent of Scotland’s overall employment in that sector.  
There are a number of non-UK EU nationals in public administration – around 19,600 – but 
this only equates to around 2.4 per cent of employment in that sector.  
The Scottish Government has also identified six growth sectors.  
Table 4.13, shows the number of people employed and the share of total employment in four 
of these (data on energy and life sciences is not available).   
Table 4.13: Employment by growth sector 2015 
Growth sector EU Nationals (000s) 
% of all in employment 
by sector 
Food and Drink 8 11.3 
Finance & Business Services 7 3.3 
Tourism 20 10.8 
Creative Industries 9 7.3 
All Sectors 115  
Source: Annual Population Survey 
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Within this, we know that some sub-sectors are more dependent than others. For example, 
in the manufacture of food products, the same statistics reveal that a quarter of all people in 
employment are non-UK EU nationals.  
Finally, Table 4.14 shows that over a third of EU nationals (16-64) in Scotland have a degree 
level qualification or higher.  
 
Table 4.14 Highest qualification of population (16-64) by nationality: Scotland, 2015 
  UK nationals EU nationals Non-EU 
nationals 
Degree level & above  26.7% 35.0% 53.7% 
Higher & Further Education below degree level 15.5% 14.5% 11.8% 
Below Higher or Further education including no qualifications 54.7% 25.4% 21.5% 
Other qualifications 3.2% 25.1% 13.0% 
Source: Annual Population Survey 
 
Concerns around implications for skills, particularly in some highly specialised activities, has 
also been expressed. See for example the recent Scottish Government report on the 
Contribution of EEA Citizens Scotland37.   
 
4.7 Issues in particular sectors 
In addition to these macroeconomic factors, we also know that there are a number of 
specific issues relevant to particular sectors in Scotland. We briefly discuss some of these in 
turn here.  
 
Universities  
Scotland’s University sector faces a number of unique issues, particularly related to its 
teaching and research activities.   
Firstly, there are over 13,000 undergraduate students from the EU studying in Scotland, who 
enjoy the same tuition fee free education as Scottish students38. The status of these 
students for fees and funding has been guaranteed for the duration of their studies. 
                                                          
37
 www.gov.scot/Resource/0052/00527186.pdf  
38
 www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-
79_Brexit_Higher_Education_in_Scotland.pdf  
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However, their future immigration status should they choose to stay beyond their studies is 
not yet clear.  
Secondly, 17 per cent of Scotland’s academic staff and 25 per cent of research staff are 
from the EU39. Their status – and their perception of life in the UK – will be important for 
attracting global talent in the future.  
Finally, Scottish Universities have benefited from EU funding. Organisations in Scotland 
have secured €217 million in Horizon 2020 research and innovation funding since 201440. 
Such funds – but just as crucially the opportunity to work collaboratively across networks –
boosts Scotland’s scientific and business reputation.   
 
Farming 
In 2016, there were around 63,500 people employed in agriculture41.  
Firstly, there is the issue of what might happen to CAP payments post-Brexit. For the 2014-
20 period, Scotland’s share of the UK’s EU CAP funding is around 17 per cent42, greater 
than a population share.  
The Scottish Government are likely to oppose any notion that such funding should be 
allocated on a per capita basis.  
Secondly, application of tariffs under a WTO model would have significant implications. The 
EU’s average tariff on agricultural products is one of its highest. This would obviously apply – 
initially – to imports coming in to the UK from Europe (e.g. Ireland). The result is likely to be 
some disruption to existing business models. Setting the right tariff regime will be important. 
High tariffs would raise the cost to UK consumers, whereas lower tariffs could undermine the 
agricultural sector’s competitiveness.  
Thirdly in recent years, many seasonal workers – particularly in the fruit and vegetable 
market – have been EU migrants43.   
Finally, there is the issue of which tier of government takes responsibility for farming. 
Agriculture is currently a non-reserved policy. However, this is not yet clear cut. There is the 
                                                          
39
 Higher Education Statistics Agency (2016)  
40
 www.gov.scot/Topics/International/Europe/Benefits-EU-Membership/Funding  
41
 www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Agriculture-Fisheries/agritopics/farmlabour  
42
 www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_17-
12_Agriculture_and_Brexit_in_10_Charts.pdf  
43
 www.nfus.org.uk/news/news/scottish-agricultures-seasonal-workers-needs-pressed-to-uk-government-
ministers    
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budget issue as set out above but also other complications such as responsibility over 
economic issues (e.g. although agricultural policy might be devolved, issues relating to trade 
could be reserved).  
 
Fishing 
In 2015, Peterhead, Lerwick and Fraserburgh accounted for 48 per cent by quantity and 32 
per cent by value of all landings by UK vessels44. According to the Scottish Seafood 
Association, almost half of the 12,000 jobs supported by the UK processing sector are based 
in Scotland45. 
But at an aggregate level, the fishing industry makes a relatively small contribution to the 
overall economy.  
Around 5,000 people are employed on fishing vessels in Scotland either through regular 
employment or temporary work46. This is equivalent to around 0.2 per cent of total Scottish 
employment.   
However, in certain parts of the country – for example, the North East – fishing plays a 
significant role in local communities.  
The Common Fisheries Policy has been one of the most controversial elements of the EU. It 
has led to a system of shared access and management of stocks.  
Post-Brexit, the UK would gain responsibility for managing the fish stocks in its Exclusive 
Economic Zone.  
There are a number of issues to be mindful of.  
Firstly, fish products face high tariffs if entering EU markets.  
Secondly, the UK is a net importer of fish. In 2015, the UK imported 681 thousand tonnes of 
fish (excluding fish products) whilst it exported 443 thousand tonnes. The EU is the largest 
single source of UK fish imports.  
                                                          
44
 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/598208/UK_Sea_Fisheries_Statistics_20
15_full_report.pdf  
45
 See http://scottishseafoodassociation.com/about/  
46
 A fisherman is defined as a person working at sea on a commercial fishing vessel. It excludes persons not 
working at sea, such as administrators and land-based processing staff. 
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Thirdly, fisheries debates will remain highly charged. There is likely to be a trade-off between 
access to waters and access to markets. Securing greater quotas with no impact on trade 
access seems an ambitious goal to aim for.  
Finally, as highlighted above, the fishing industry is relatively small in terms of its overall 
impact in the economy. It is by no means certain how different sectors will be prioritised 
when it comes to ‘doing a deal’, particularly at the UK level.  
 
Oil and Gas  
Scotland’s oil and gas industry is global, both in terms of the markets it operates in and the 
supply of workers. It is arguably less directly impacted by Brexit.  
The average MFN tariff in the oil and petroleum sector is 2.5 per cent, one of the lowest.  
One way it could be impacted upon would be through cost of imported components, 
particularly in specialised metal and engineering products.  
Non-tariff barriers – particularly in terms environmental and energy market standards – could 
play a role. Whilst a decision will have to be taken on technical standards as determined by 
the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN).  
Rules of origin could have practical implications where particular engineering elements, 
spares or mechanical parts, might be needed quickly and to be sourced from across Europe.  
More generally on energy, the UK will be outside the Internal Energy Market.  
 
Financial and Business Services 
Scotland’s financial and business services industry employs around 220,000 people in 
Scotland47.  
For many, the EU is an important source of demand – either directly or through ties with the 
City of London.  
The key issue for financial services will be the issue of passporting services.  
The EU passporting system enables firms that are authorised in an EU (or EEA) country to 
trade freely with minimal additional authorisation. They are based on the single EU rulebook 
for financial services. Non-EU firms face significant regulatory barriers to providing cross-
border banking and investment services.  
                                                          
47
 www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Business/Publications/GrowthSectors/Database  
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Certain EU legislation provides for ‘third country’ regimes which allow non-EU based firms to 
offer a limited number of services if their home country is accepted as being ‘equivalent’. 
However, they apply to a handful of services, are much more limited in scope and can be 
withdrawn unilaterally.  
It seems unlikely that there is significant scope for new markets – outside of Europe – to be 
developed quickly. Trade agreements that cover services are very difficult, with even the EU 
Single Market imperfect despite decades of work to improve access.  
 
Pharmaceuticals 
The pharmaceutical industry in Scotland is a major employer. It exports a significant amount 
of its outputs to the EU and is part of a pan-EU supply chain.  
Most OECD countries have imposed zero tariffs. As this is part of existing WTO schedules 
for the EU (and therefore for the UK), this should continue.  
Perhaps of greater interest to the industry will be the rules and standards that the UK will 
have in place post-Brexit and the importance of being recognised as equivalent by the EU 
(including issues like product labelling etc.) Rules of origin could also be administratively 
costly where supply chains and research and development tend to be shared across 
countries.  
 
Scotch whisky 
Ninety per cent of Scotch whisky is sold outside the UK48. Europe is a significant market. 
The Scotch Whisky Association estimates that it sold around £1.2 billion into the EU in 2015.  
The legal implications for Scotch whisky post-Brexit are complex.  
On the one hand, Scotch whisky should benefit from zero tariffs to the EU under WTO rules.  
However, given the global nature of Scotch, what is just as important will be the EU’s 
network of bi-lateral trade deals with other countries. Here lies an opportunity as well as a 
risk.  
A further complication concerns the legal protection of Scotch. The EU’s Geographical 
Indication scheme protects it from imitation products. Some equivalent scheme will be 
needed.  
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 See www.scotch-whisky.org.uk/news-publications/news/brexit-what-now-for-scotch-whisky/#.WZxt5z6GNhE  
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